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POLICY ISSUES IN PRIMARY
INDUSTRIES
Zuhayr Mikdashi*
Business and government have espoused a variety of policies to
exploit market forces to their advantage. This article explores the
policies involved with important issues affecting relationships
among protagonists in primary industries and offers some suggestions. The first section deals with "freeing" the supply of key information not normally accessible to less developed countries
(LDC's). Sections two and three relate to two aspects of international trade: easing hardships resulting from interruptions in resource flows; and redistributing gain from resource industries
among trading countries. The final two sections of the article deal
with development financing, and with the accommodation of foreign investments with a country's perception of its sovereignty.
I.

A

MECHANISM TO PROMOTE THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION

An article in The Economist states, "knowledge is now the most
important economic resource."' The availability of relevant up-todate information, its transfer and adaptation to local conditions,
and its effective and efficient use are crucial to progress.2 To improve the flow of key information not normally accessible to
LDC's, the creation of a Resource Advisory Service (RAS) agency
seems warranted.
RAS's function could consist of centralizing the collection, storage and dissemination of information to member countries and to
their agencies. The scope of the information should, in principle,
be worldwide and involve trade and freight figures; costs of various
* Associate Professor of Business Administration, American University of Beirut. B.A., 1954, M.A., 1956, American University of Beirut; B.Litt., 1958, D.Phil.,
1971, Oxford University. This article will appear in Dr. Mikdashi's forthcoming
book, BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT IN RESOURCE INDUSTRIES: A MULTINATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE. The author wishes to express his appreciation to the Ford Founda-

tion for its generous support of this project.
1. THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 27, 1969, at 10.
2.

See, e.g., 0.

HERFINDAHL, NATURAL RESOURCE INFORMATION FOR ECONOMIC

(1969); Information as a Key to Progress, THE OECD
April 1972, at 6-8.
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inputs; market and credit opportunities; fiscal charges, trade barriers or incentives in countries concerned; and a roster of firms,
institutions and experts dealing with various aspects of the resource in question.
RAS is likely to offer many interrelated advantages. It could
prevent exploitation of ignorance; bring competitive forces to
work; reduce uncertainty and facilitate decision making; permit
more efficient and effective use of opportunities; reduce losses from
miscalculations or premature commitments; possibly reduce the
scope for bigotry, venality, misunderstanding or even conflict;
publicize the relevant experiences of other nations; and permit a
wider and quicker access to technical knowledge, managerial
know-how, credit opportunities and tax information. Impartiality
and speed in responding to requests from member countries and
their enterprises are obviously essential to the successful operation
of RAS.
It may prove too ambitious for the proposed RAS to act outright
as a central repository and disseminator of comprehensive information in the natural resources field. Accordingly, it is more realistic in an early stage of operation to have RAS act as an intermediary, advising on the various sources for such information. Should
individual countries, most likely LDC's, be unable to secure outof-the-way information through their own means, RAS could then
undertake to provide it and to advise on its authenticity and accuracy. Moreover, it will be more manageable for RAS to begin its
activities with one commodity (probably one about which information is comparatively inaccessible to LDC's) or one subject matter
of developmental significance, say, taxation.3 Once proven workable and successful, its activities could be enlarged to encompass
progressively the whole field of natural resources. Such a scheme
already has been discussed favorably by the United Nations Committee on Natural Resources.' It would involve the cooperation of
interested national, regional and international organizations.
3. Dudley Seers recommended the creation of a similar international agency
that would advise governments on tax and conservation matters. Seers, Big Companies and Small Countries:A PracticalProposal,16 KYKLOS 605-06 (Basel 1963).
See also Report on the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science
and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas, 2 NATURAL
REsOURCES 195-96, 200 (1963).

4. Committee on Natural Resources, Report on the First Session, 1 U.N.
ECOSOC, 22-23, U.N. Doc. E/4969, E/C.7/13 (1971).
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Availability of information in itself, however, is not sufficient.
It must be adapted to the particular needs of the individual countries concerned. In addition, feedbacks must be arranged on a
permanent and regular basis in order to control, evaluate and improve the relevance of the information made available. There is a
need for effective links between the RAS and the beneficiary countries if the agency is to advise on the efficient use of the information that it provides. These links could be established through
experts who are prepared to assist in drafting legislation, in setting
up natural resources departments, in helping to formulate plans
and forecasts of demand and supply, and in identifying up-to-date
competitive terms for contracts and new market opportunities.
Resource advisors should not be expected to assume decisionmaking prerogatives in their dealings with member states. Their
function should be limited to elucidating alternatives and to
analyzing elements of costs and benefits for various courses of
action.
II.

SECURITY OF RESOURCE FLOwS

Basic minerals and several other commodities are vital to modern economies. This has led to a wide international concern for
"security of supply" and for "security of demand." Insecurity of
resource flows may result from war, from natural hazards, from
domestic problems, from governmental actions (e.g., embargoes,
blockades, trade barriers or expropriations), or from company actions (e.g., lockouts of labor or boycott of supplies).
The term "security" may convey different meanings to different
parties: it may mean the continued and regular physical availability of commodities regardless of the attached economic or noneconomic terms; or it may mean physical availability at terms economically and politically acceptable to the parties concerned. For
the United States, national security of oil flow has been defined as
requiring four major objectives:
(1) Maintain a satisfactory level of domestic reserves of
crude oil, supplemented from secure sources of foreign supply;
(2) Maintain spare capacity to produce and deliver crude oil
when international factors disrupt supplies from other
sources;
(3) Maintain refinery capacity in the United States adequate to meet both defense and essential civilian needs in
periods of disruption of normal world oil trade; and
Vol. 7-No. 2
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(4) Provide a petroleum industry in the United States with
the capacity to meet the nation's defense and essential civilian needs at all times.
In the United States, restrictions on oil imports were in force
from 1958 to 1973, admittedly at a cost to consumers, to protect
the domestic petroleum industry and to preclude undue dependence on the vicissitudes of foreign sources. Estimates of the cost
of the United States import program vary considerably. Evidence
submitted to a Congressional Joint Economic Subcommittee suggests, however, that the net cost for the American public increased
by "a rock-bottom minimum of $7.4 billion more in the six-year
period ended in 1970 than in the previous half-dozen years."'
Observers are generally familiar with aspects of supply security.7
The concept of demand security has not received, until recently,
equal attention, at least from academicians and analysts., "Demand interruption" refers to the decision of one or more of the
industrially developed countries and of their international enterprises to interrupt, curtail or boycott directly or indirectly the
regular exports of one country or a group of countries. As on the
supply side, such interruptions may be prompted by mixed
politico-economic motives, such as the nationalization by LDC's
of assets belonging to developed countries' enterprises. The LDC's
faced by demand interruption may not have the resource flexibility
or the administrative ability to change their pattern of exports in
the short or intermediate run. In addition, the absence of a diversified economic base may preclude them from making up for a loss
of exports in one commodity by increased exports in other commodities. These countries, faced with demand interruption, could
have their socio-economic programs and their internal stability
impaired.
One historic example of demand interruption was that con5. Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 45 on National Goals Symposium Before the
Senate Comm. on Interior and InsularAffairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 48990 (1971) (statement by George A. Lincoln, Director, Office of Emergency Preparedness).
6. Washington Post, Jan. 9, 1972, § A, at 5, col. 1.
7. See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION STAFF REPORT, RESOURCES FOR THE
FUTURE: ENERGY RESEARCH NEEDS (1971); S. SCHURR & P. HOMAN, MIDDLE EASTERN OIL AND THE WESTERN WORLD 14-16 (1971).
8. See M. TANZER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL OIL AND THE
UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES 319-48 (1969).
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nected with the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951.
For over three years, Iran was faced with a total boycott of oil
exports instituted by major international companies that supported the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petroleum
Company) in questioning the legitimacy of Iran's nationalization.
Moreover, Anglo-Iranian and the British Government threatened
companies that might break the boycott with confiscation of Iranian oil on the high seas and with legal action. The World Bank
and the IMF boycotted Iran for a while. The legitimacy of the
nationalization, one should add, was upheld in 1952 by the International Court of Justice, but the industry boycott was maintained
until late 1954 on the grounds that compensation offered by the
Iranian Government was inadequate. The impact of the suspension of oil flows on the Iranian economy, dependent on oil for some
80 per cent of export earnings, was shattering.?
To lighten the burden of interruptions, permanent multilateral
mechanisms may be necessary to establish rules and standards of
compensation. Another approach could be to resort to ad hoc solutions for the mobilization of aid on a voluntary basis, as and when
interruptions occur. A third approach could consist of having a
standing committee that would convene on short notice to consider
the problem at hand. The first approach has the merit of permanency; it also provides participants a prior knowledge of what to
expect in the event of interruptions and accordingly reduces uncertainty. The third approach is a compromise; it provides for the
firm opportunity to discuss matters, with no commitment on the
9. A recent example of demand interruption was the French decision in mid1971 to boycott Algerian oil, for which France was the major consumer. The
French action was prompted by their opposition to Algeria's partial nationalization (up to 51%) of hitherto French-controlled companies in Algeria, and by their
disapproval of compensation terms offered by Algeria. The French Government
was reported to have made representations (1) to the United States Government
to cause a ban on prospective Algerian gas imports into the United States; (2) to
the World Bank and other financial institutions to block any loans to Algeria until
France received for its nationalized interests terms it deemed satisfactory; and
(3) to other trading partners of Algeria, notably West European countries, Japan
and the Soviet Union. The dispute between Algeria and France was resolved by
the end of 1971. See Boumediene Analyzes Franco-AlgerianOil Crisis, MIDDLE
EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY, June 18, 1971, at 5. See also OIL & GAS J., June 21, 1971,
at 80; Petroleum Press Service, June 1971, at 204-05; Sonatrach, AlgeriaPetroleum, PETROLEUM TIMES, June 4, 1971, at 1; Washington Post, July 28, 1971,
§ A, at 11, col. 1.
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nature or amount of compensation to the suffering country. In the
absence of such mechanisms, several countries have adopted individual measures such as building stockpiles of strategic and critical materials. Others, as shown below, have attempted to achieve
inter-country cooperation and assistance.
A.

Developed Market Economies

In the past two decades, the Western developed countries have
taken steps individually and collectively to meet possible emergencies in oil supply interruptions. For example, after the nationalization of the Suez Canal but two months prior to its closing, planning
measures for an interruption in oil supplies were undertaken by
American companies through a Middle East Emergency Committee, set up by the United States Foreign Petroleum Supply Committee. A similar organization was established by the Organization
for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). Essentially the
same mechanism was reactivated in 1967 by the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) grouping the
developed countries of North America, Western Europe, and
Japan. 10
More specifically, the intergovernmental OECD Oil Committee
collects and analyzes data on current and prospective conditions
of demand and supply for petroleum and gas. It advises, plans and
administers the scheduling, apportioning and storage of oil supplies for the benefit of member countries in periods of emergencies.
In addition, it monitors a stockpiling program for West European
countries that was begun at the time of the Suez crisis in 1956."
The OECD governments have authorized company representatives
to organize themselves into an international Industry Advisory
Body, and to meet on an ad hoc basis in the event that oil supplies
are threatened.' 2 Periodic meetings are held between the Oil Committee and leading executives of oil companies in member countries to discuss the problems of the industry. Besides the OECD
Oil Committee, Western countries coordinate domestic and international emergency preparedness planning within their defense
organizations. The leading example is that of the North Atlantic
10.

11.

S. SCHURR & P. HOMAN, supra note 7, at 14 n.12.
Oil Supplies-1970, THE OECD OBSERVER, Oct. 1971, at 29.
Id.; see Energy Policy in the European Community, THE OECD OBSERVER,

12.
June 1972, at 36-39.
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Treaty Organization (NATO). This focuses on both military and
civilian emergency planning. NATO's Petroleum Planning Com3
mittee meets periodically, usually in Brussels.'
It has been suggested that the most realistic way to keep supply
interruptions from being employed as an instrument of policy is to
render such interruptions useless. Thus, the threat to use oil as a
weapon would be an empty one, and its actual use, if attempted,
futile.'" The objective of assuring supplies, according to Western
analysts, can best be achieved, assuming no military intervention
or political coercion, by building inventories or by keeping some
domestic reserves unproduced to buy time for developing alternatives or for countering emergencies. The OECD countries' minimum stockpile of crude oil and products in early 1973 was equivalent to 45 days of current consumption. The minimum would be
raised to 60 days by 1975.' 5
B.

Developed Centrally Planned Economies

East European countries and Mongolia are linked economically
through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA).
These countries constitute a reasonably self-sufficient economic
area for several basic commodities. Since the mid-1960's, supplydemand imbalances, coupled with freer international trade, have
led to significant exchanges with countries outside the CMEA
area. For example, Soviet oil and gas exports from Siberian fields
to Western Europe are counterbalanced by gas imports from Afghanistan and Iran to the southern industrial centers of the Soviet
Union, and by Eastern Europe's oil imports from the Middle East
and North Africa.
CMEA countries agreed at their 25th session in Bucharest in
August 1971 to pool efforts to insure adequate supplies of fuel and
other raw materials. Their ultimate goals are integration, specialization and balanced growth at the regional level. The leadership

13.

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, 21ST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ACTIVITIES

H.R. REP. No. 92-843, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 271 (1972).
14. S. SCHURR & P. HOMAN, supra note 7, at 15. See also Gordon, Without
Rudder, Compass, or Chart-The Problem of Energy Policy Guidelines, 64
OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON DEFENSE PRODUCTION,

QUARTERLY OF THE COLORADO SCHOOL OF MINES

29, 41 (No. 4, 1969).

15. See Energy Policy in the European Community,
June 1972, at 37.
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of the Soviet Union and its capacity to carry out cooperative
schemes in the CMEA are crucial factors of success. East European cooperation in fuel and raw material industries includes research and production of advanced equipment, long-term credits,
intraregional trade, an oil and gas pipeline network, a CMEA-wide
search for minerals, and joint ventures to pool resources and
achieve specialization and economies of size.' 6 Soviet sources claim
that CMEA cooperation in the oil trade between the Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia resulted in lower cost imports to the latter
than would have been the case with imports from outside CMEA.Y7
C. Developing Importing Countries
The LDC's, unlike developed countries, do not have multinational mechanisms designed to protect them against unforeseen
interruptions in the trade or supply of basic commodities. It is
suggested that a Commodity Insurance Fund (CIF) be set up for
the purpose of assisting these countries during interruptions, financially or in kind through compensatory supplies from alternative (and admittedly more costly) resources. The Fund could be
financed by voluntary contributions from the United Nations
member states, and by assessments levied on participating member countries, probably based on their per capita income and population. The CIF could also conceivably be used as an international
stockpile agency and carry out functions similar to national stockpile agencies.
For several countries, sudden interruption of trade flows, especially in certain commodities, is similar in its effects to a natural
disaster. The world community already has recognized that hardships arising from the latter must be alleviated. In fact, as of early
1972, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has a Disaster
Relief Co-ordinator reporting to him. One of his functions is to
"mobilize, direct and co-ordinate the relief activities of the various
organizations of the United Nations system in response to a re16. See New Comecon Drive Banking on Oil, Gas, OIL & GAS J., Aug. 30, 1971,
at 26-27; Ratnieks, Development of Fuel and Raw Material Resources in the
COMECON Countries, PETROLEUM TIMES (London), June 30/July 14, 1972, at 18;
Zubkov, CMEA Countries' Cooperation in the Fuel, Power and Raw-Material
Industries,INT'L AFFAIRS (Moscow), Dec. 1971, at 107-09.
17. Zubkov, supranote 16, at 107; see Bogomolov & Barkovsky, Economic Cooperation among the CMEA Countries, 21 EcoN. BULL. FOR ASIA & FAR EAST 11
(No. 3, 1970) (U.N. Doc. E/CN.11/1000).
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quest for disaster assistance from a stricken State." Additionally,
he coordinates UN assistance with assistance given by intergovernmental organizations. He also promotes the study, prevention and
control of disasters, and provides advice to governments on predisaster planning.' The assistance offered in natural catastrophes
conceivably could be extended to economic catastrophes, if a majority of UN members agree to it. To get such an agreement is,
admittedly, far from easy.
D. Developing Exporting Countries
Primary exporting countries have taken public cognizance of the
impact of demand interruptions on their economies. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) Conference instructed OPEC's Secretary General "to convene a Working Party
of experts from Member Countries at Headquarters in order to
prepare a study on the establishment of a fund to assist any Member Country affected by actions taken against it by oil companies."' 9 The matter was still under study in 1973. There are, nevertheless, examples of one or more OPEC member countries coming
at their own initiative to the rescue of another member country.
For example, Libya assisted Algeria with a 100 million dollar advance after Algeria was faced in mid-1971 with a boycott from the
oil companies following its partial nationalization of French concessionaires. The Algerians managed to overcome their financial
difficulties, and to settle with the French companies, without having to make use of Libyan credit.2 0 Iraq received credits from Kuwait and Libya following the boycott it faced in 1972 after instituting nationalization measures. Primary exporting countries are concerned about the most realistic way to keep demand interruptions
from being employed, and to render such interruptions useless.
The most practical approach in the short run is to have these
countries increase their international financial reserves, as some
have done. In the longer run, they should aim at a balanced diversification of their economic resources, at a reduced dependence on
18. 51 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 25, U.N. Doc. E/5073 (1971), reproduced
in U.N. INFORMATION SERVICE, ROUND-UP OF THE 51ST SESSION OF THE ECONOMIC AND

31-32 (Geneva, July 30, 1971).
For the text of the OPEC Communique see

SOCIAL COUNCIL

19.

MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC

SURVEY, March 10, 1972, at 5.
20. Boumediene Acknowledges Libyan Support During Franco-Algerian
Crisis, MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY, March 3, 1972, at 4.
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primary exports and at a joint insurance mechanism. As to the
latter suggestion, Algeria, Iraq and Libya agreed on May 23, 1970,
to create a joint cooperative fund to aid any of the contracting
states that "may suffer harm as a result of a confrontation with the
exploiting oil companies."'2 The fund, as of 1973, has not been set
up.
CIPEC countries also have attempted to face up to the boycott
of their exports, and more generally to "economic aggression." The
latter term was defined as "any act which impedes or hinders the
exercise of the sovereign right of countries to dispose freely of their
national resources in order to further their development." CIPEC
countries agreed not to take advantage of the situation created by
such aggression against a member state. They also agreed to study
methods of raising funds to assist that country, and to cooperate
in this matter with other organizations of LDC's exporting raw
2
materials, notably OPEC. 1
All developing countries, whether importers or exporters, share
a concern for the security of trade and economic relations vis-a-vis
their important trading partners, the advanced industrial nations.
This concern has prompted a group of 21 Latin American countries
to place a resolution before the UN General Assembly's Political
Committee urging the Assembly to "take appropriate measures for
the creation of a system of collective security to encourage sustained development and the expansion of national economies."
This group of countries along with other LDC's are fearful of the
economic blackmail to which industrial countries can successfully
resort with the same effect as military blackmail. As explained by
a Latin American diplomat, "We have tried to build safeguards
against nuclear terror through a whole variety of disarmament
measures in recent years. But our countries can be destroyed by
economic terror as practiced by the industrialized countries,
whether it is the United States or the Soviet Union or the Common
Market, almost as severely as by nuclear terror."23

22.

For the text of the Algerian-Libyan-Iraqi Joint Communique see MIDDLE
29, 1970, at 2-3.
Measures of Defense and Solidarity,in THE COPPER MARKET app. 1 (1972).

23.

SocIETY

21.

EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY, May

FOR INT'L DEVELOPMENT, SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

3 (1971).
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III.

NATURAL RESOURCES AND GAIN FROM TRADE

The economies of several developing countries are narrowly
based. Their foreign exchange and budgetary receipts and their
national income are vulnerable to adverse changes in market and
other conditions affecting one or two major export commodities.
Ironing out price fluctuations of primary export commodities, however, would in itself be insufficient protection for developing economies. It must be coupled with growth of export earnings and with
price stabilization of goods these countries import, notably manufactures. A leading United States lawmaker, Senator Frank
Church, has advocated that "as an alternative to the palliative of
aid, .

.

. we lend positive support to developing countries by enter-

ing into commercial arrangements that redress the terms of trade
which are now rigged against them."24
To tackle the problem of protecting the export earnings of developing countries, UNCTAD25 and other international forums have
suggested the stabilization of terms of trade. This principle was
applied, although admittedly in a crude fashion, for the first time
in 1971 by OPEC in agreement with the international oil companies. 2 The stabilization of terms of trade purports to protect the
purchasing power of a unit of export in terms of imports. Assuming
this is administratively feasible, there is the risk that an automatic
matching of the export price of a primary commodity with increases in the import price index of these countries may render
that commodity less competitive, and eventually reduce the demand for it in favor of substitutes.
Demand for primary commodities is usually derived from demand for their finished products. Prices of these finished products
are influenced by a number of factors including the price of raw
materials. It is significant that the value of raw materials is generally a small portion of the price of end products. By comparison,
the shares of labor (wages) and of the state (taxes) are more substantial and generally on the increase in the developed industrial
24.
25.

117 CONG. REC. 38258 (1971); Washington Post, Nov. 7, 1971, § B, at 4.
See, e.g., Report of the Trade and Development Board, 26 U.N. GAOR,

Supp. 15, at 236, U.N. Doc. AI8415/Rev. 1 (1972).
26. See Z. MIKDASHI, THE COMMUNITY OF OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES ch.7
(1972); Mikdashi, A la recherche d'un accroissement des benkfices kconomiques:
les negotiations par les termes de.l'echange, 2 ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 529-61
(1971).
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countries. This applies to petroleum and metal products. Accordingly, it is unrealistic to impute to primary exporters attempting
to stablize or improve the purchasing power of their export earnings the sole responsibility for pricing their commodities out of the
27
market.
It is possible that substitution of one commodity for another will
not have a net adverse effect on the developing world if both the
beneficiary countries and the losing countries are developing. It is,
however, possible that the losers will be the least developed, leading consequently to a decline in world welfare (abstracting considerations of income distribution within these countries). Should the
substitution favor commodities produced in the developed countries, say, synthetic packaging materials, at the expense of the
developing countries, (in this case producing tin, iron ore or aluminum) world welfare will be worse off. Alternatively, should substitution favor commodities produced in the developing countries,
say, petroleum, at the expense of a more costly protected commodity produced in the developed countries (for example, coal), world
welfare will be better off. In Western Europe for example, gas oil
excise taxes for the major consumer countries (France, Germany,
Italy and the United Kingdom) accounted for more than 60 per
cent of the price early in 1972 while its domestic competitors,
notably coal and nuclear power, were heavily subsidized. Imports
on gasoline serve partly to pay for the social infrastructure required
in the consumption of these products, such as roads, and partly to
offer a convenient and effective means of taxing the national econ28
omy.
There are, however, instances of agreements between the governments of both exporting and importing countries to control consumer prices. For example, the United Kingdom obtained from
Norway in 1933 a pledge regarding the maximum prices at which
the Norwegian state liquor monopoly would sell British whiskey.2"
If a spirit of closer international economic cooperation is to guide
transactions among nations, it may be proper to investigate means
27.

See, e.g., U.S.

STEEL ANN.

REP. (recent reports); 'Real' Oil Costs are Still

Below 1957 Levels, PETROLEUM INTELLIGENCE WEEKLY, Mar. 27, 1972, at 5-6.
28. See, e.g., P6trole Brut, Essence, Imp6t, BULLETIN MENSUEL D' INFORMATIONS, ENTERPRISE DE RECHERCHES ET D'ACTIVITIES PkTROLIERES,

Sept. 25, 1972, at

1-3.

29.

LEAGUE OF NATIONS, TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN FREE-MARKET AND CON-

TROLLED ECONOMIES

74 (1943).
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of reducing the fiscal and other burdens and trade restrictions
imposed by advanced countries on finished products derived from
raw materials largely exported by developing countries to the extent that these burdens and restrictions adversely affect their consumption in favor of substitutes.
LDC's are not only concerned about a deterioration in their
terms of trade, they are equally concerned about the related problem of devaluation in the currency of major trading countries,
notably that of the United States. One Western trade source
argued that the American devaluation of 1971 hurt LDC's thus:
From the standpoint of raw material producers and especially the
developing nations, this is a major fraud. Seen in its simplest terms,
the industrialized nations have revalued and the developing nations, dependent upon raw materials have devalued and, with the
United States as the dominant factor in major commodities, most
metals and minerals will tend to follow the American currency. The
result is that raw materials will be cheaper for Europe and Japan;
for the developing nations, their mineral wealth, in the future, will
buy fewer tractors, fewer hospitals, less food. 30
Alone among LDC's, the OPEC countries, through concerted action, managed to shield themselves against the adverse effect of
the dollar devaluations.
The argument often advocated by LDC's of protecting the purchasing power of their export proceeds is essentially an argument
in equity. One should guard against its indiscriminate use in reshaping economic relations between primary exporter and importer countries. If the argument were to be applied to commodities with elastic demand, it might hurt exporters. Conversely, if
applied to commodities with inelastic demand, it can permit partial exploitation of consumer surplus by the producing countries.
In addition, economic development does not hinge solely on the
of trade; other important factors may well
stabilization of terms
3
prove more crucial. '
30. MINING J., Dec. 24, 1971, at 573.
31. Several scholars have called for the taxing of minerals (including fossil
fuels) and metals-the tax to be collected by an international administration-as
a means of redistributing wealth in favor of the poor countries. Professor Ian
Little, for example, favors arranging commodities in noncompeting groups, and
offers three criteria for tax levels: (1) competing commodities within each group
should be taxed at relative rates designed to minimize substitution; (2) levels of
taxes between groups should vary with their pollution impact and the risk of
Vol. 7-No. 2

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

IV.

FUNDS FOR DEVELOPMENT AND INSURANCE

As put by a former senior United States official, "The World
Bank and the regional banks are important, but they are the chosen instruments of the rich nations, not of the poor."3 2 The logic
of development would therefore seem to call for new financial institutions.'One such institution might be an interregional Third
World Bank (TWB), largely owned and financed by nationals and
governments of LDC's that happen to be in a surplus capital position. Its function would be to service eligible LDC's worldwide.
impending exhaustion; and (3) tax levels should maximize the chances of political
acceptance. Given the difficulty of accurate determination of the first two criteria, expediency would give the third criterion greater weight.
Ian Little argues that "the demand for each such group of commodities would
undoubtedly be very inelastic, implying that the taxes would be mostly passed
on to consumers." Little, InternationalTax on the Rich to Help the Poor, THE
TWES (London), May 9, 1972, at 21. This is likely to be the case if private
enterprise and government in consuming countries do not react to higher tax-paid
costs by developing substitutes to the minerals and metals in question. Little opts
for a tax on exports rather than on consumption of products to avoid "considerable distortion" and to reduce "expense in collection." He assumes that additional
taxes on producer countries will not hurt them given the inelasticity of demand
(or absence of substitutability) for their products. These contentions must be
demonstrated over the longer run for various minerals and metals traded internationally before producer countries submit to taxes without assurance that their
interests will not be adversely affected.
Estimated tax proceeds from this proposal vary between five and ten billion
dollars. Little suggests that the proceeds be disbursed directly to LDC's in inverse
relation to their per capita income, with a dividing line for those eligible, possibly
countries with per capita incomes of less than $700. He is opposed to giving these
resources to existing international institutions and programs for fear that it would
result in a corresponding decrease in current levels of contributions by donor
nations.
The success of Little's scheme hinges on all major developed consuming countries submitting, since the consumption of minerals and materials varies directly
with per capita income, and the richer countries therefore will be paying the bulk
of the international tax. Four questions remain: (1) if the rich are invited to pay,
will they accept; (2) why should the tax be limited to minerals and metals, and
not tax other major commodities, primary and nonprimary; (3) is this scheme an
initial step toward a worldwide central fiscal authority, and could this entail a
generalized progressive consumption or income tax imposed in all countries for
development purposes; and (4) would the long-term interests of exporters of taxed
minerals be protected. These are significant problems that ultimately will require
a political will for solution.
32. Yost, Growing Sentiment for Isolationism, Washington Post, Nov. 7,1971,
§ B, at 6.
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There are a few developing countries (e.g., a number of mineral
exporting countries) that have surplus financial resources. Private
citizens, enterprises and government agencies of these countries
deliberately have been channeling substantial amounts of their
surplus resources to the developed nations. It is difficult to estimate the amount of financial resources held by LDC nationals and
agents in the developed money and capital markets, but estimates
for oil exporting countries alone reach several billion dollars. However, some surplus capital LDC's are beginning to invest their
resources in other LDC's. The leading example of long-term credit
offered by a developing country to other developing countries is
that of the state-owned Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED). KFAED loans from 1961 to 1970 amounted to
about 350 million dollars.? Another developing country, Abu
Dhabi, created a similar fund for Arab economic development in
1971 with a capital of 105 million dollars.3 4 Kuwait had, by 1972,
also offered the World Bank over 243 million dollars in direct financing-by underwriting the Bank's bonds in Kuwait through the
3"
Kuwait Investment Company.
The loans provided by Kuwait and Abu Dhabi to countries in
the region are not prompted by pure altruism. In fact, most loans
earn rates comparable to those granted by the World Bank. Moreover, Abu Dhabi and especially Kuwait have used loans to neighboring Arab countries as a means of winning friends, and of averting possible territorial ambitions. For example, Iraq claimed total
sovereignty over all of Kuwait territory in 1961, but in 1964 accepted reluctantly the independence of Kuwait, although boundaries remained disputed until 1973. Iraq has been a large beneficiary
of Kuwaiti credits.
To encourage the flow of financial resources and venture capital
among developing nations, institutional frameworks aimed at resolving disputes or at insuring risks not normally covered by commercial underwriters must be devised. To insure the investments
of expatriate firms, bilateral or multilateral arrangements could be

33. See AL-HAMAD, FINANCING ARAB ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, THE EXPERIENCE
OF THE KUWAIT FUND '(KuWAIT FUND FOR ARAB ECON. DEVELOPMENT, May 1972).

34. MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY,
NOMIC SURVEY, July 9, 1971, at 6.

July 23, 1971, at 5-7; MIDDLE EAST Eco-

35. International Bank for Regional Development, Press Release, World Bank
Bond Issue in Kuwait (Aug. 15, 1972).
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set up. In fact, most developed market economy countries have
bilateral insurance arrangements against so-called political risk
losses sustained by their firms on investments in certain developing countries. Such losses may arise from currency inconvertibility, expropriation, or damages from war, revolution or insurrection. Multinational investment insurance is currently under revived active consideration2 6
The United States Government has been a leader in insuring
private American investments in LDC's. It created a government
corporation called Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC), 31 which was formally organized on January 19, 1971. According to its legislative charter, OPIC's insurance is available to
new investments by American private enterprises in friendly
LDC's. The investment project must (a) be commercially sound,
(b) be beneficial to the host country, and (c) earn the approval of
the United States Government and host country authorities. 3
To broaden its insurance basis, OPIC successfully negotiated
late in 1971 with Lloyd's of London the reinsurance of 250 million
dollars of OPIC's outstanding 2.2 billion dollar expropriation insurance covering United States investments in some 70 developing
nations and areas.39 OPIC also placed another large part of its
expropriation insurance liability with a group of international underwriters including the Soviet Union's majority-owned Black Sea
and Baltic Insurance Company, registered in the United Kingdom
as a subsidiary of Ingosstrakh, the Soviet state insurance agency.
OPIC's president noted, "It is the first time that an arm of the
USSR government has supported the United States government in
insuring U.S. private investment overseas. We hope this is the
beginning of similar mutually satisfactory arrangements between
our two countries."0 This is an important shift in the policy of
Moscow and a departure from its Marxist economic philosophy. In
the words of an Indian trade journal, "[t]he meaning of the Rus36.

INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, MULTINATIONAL INVEST-

A STAFF REPORT (March 1962).
37. Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-99 (1970).
38. 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1970).
39. OPIC, 1 Topics 8 (No. 1, 1972). Substantial additional reinsurance was
made with Lloyds, European and American firms in 1973.
40. OPIC, More Reinsurance, Russians Included, 1 Topics 7 (No. 2, 1972);
USSR Company Participatesin United States Government Venture, SURVEY OF
MENT INSURANCE,

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

3 (Soc'y for Int'l Development, May 1972).
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sian decision to underwrite American investment is this: Whenever
a developing country nationalizes a firm without paying adequate
compensation it is not only the western [United States] firm but
the Soviet Union, as an insurer, who would also be a loser." 4'
United States and European international companies, which are
eligible for their own national insurance program, favor multinational insurance schemes. The latter system, argued the President
of Anaconda, would help stimulate needed investments in less
stable areas "by offering more protection and certainty than could
a single-nation agency . ..

'
'42

It should make "unfair nationali-

zation" against one investing country "an offense" against all investing countries, according to Sir Ronald Prain.413 Multinational
insurance has also been supported by a United States presidential
commission. It recommended "the creation of a multilateral insurance agency which would include the less developed countries
among its membership, and in which the costs would be equitably
shared among the members." 44 It further recommended "that the
United States encourage developing countries to adhere to the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and to use
the facilities provided by the Convention." 4 Latin American governments, however, view United States-inspired guarantee and
insurance schemes for direct foreign investment with skepticism
and suspicion, and have flatly rejected the World Bank's convention on the settlement of investment disputes as an infringement
of national sovereignty and contrary to national constitutions.
Guarantees and arbitration procedures offered and administered
jointly by Latin American nations, perhaps with the help of regional or subregional institutions, may prove to be workable and
acceptable alternatives. 6 This is similar to the suggestions of most
Middle East countries. The latter fear that a worldwide multilat41. Soviet Union Underwrites U.S. Investments, COMMERCE, May 6, 1972, at
1158 (Bombay).
42. Keynote address by Jay Parkinson, American Metal Market's Second
Annual London Forum, Oct. 26, 1970, at 16.
43. Interview with Sir Ronald Prain, Chairman of RST International Metals,
Ltd., in METAL BULL., Oct. 22, 1970, at 29.
44.

COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE & INVESTMENT POLICY,

2

UNITED STATES INTERNA-

TIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 250 (July

1971).

45. Id. at 252-53.
46. Cf. Alejandro, DirectForeignInvestment in Latin America, THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, A SYMPoSIUMt 338-39 (C.P. Kindleberger ed. 1970).
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eral scheme of insurance and dispute settlement would be dominated by the rich and powerful developed countries.
The first known example of insurance against investment risks
on a regional basis among LDC's is that of the Central African
countries of Dahomey, Ivory Coast, Niger, Togo and Upper Volta.
By a treaty signed on June 9, 1966, these countries established a
joint loan guarantee fund known as "Fonds d'entraide et de guarantie des emprunts due Conseil de l'Entente." The initial resources pool of the Fund amounted to 5.3 million dollars subscribed by members.17 Other developing countries recently have
recognized the advantages of a regional scheme for reducing noneconomic uncertainties faced by current and potential investors from
developing countries venturing into other developing countries.
One notable merit of such a scheme is to make financial and investment resources of capital-surplus developing countries more
readily available to capital-deficit countries instead of these resources being siphoned to the developed market economy countries, as has been usually the case. Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Sudan
and Syria agreed in May 1971 to set up an Arab Establishment for
Investment Insurance to be based in Kuwait with a capital of 10
million Kuwaiti dinars. 8 Its main function would be to issue guarantees against losses sustained by Arab investors in Arab member
countries. The insurance would provide protection against losses
from noncommercial risks such as expropriation, nationalization
or confiscation of property; inability to transfer income or principal
out of the host country as a result of unforeseen restrictions; and
losses due to acts of war, military operations or civil disturbances.
Among the capital-importing LDC's, Egypt's experience is
worth noting, bearing in mind that this country is ostensibly "socialist." To attract large potential investors from neighboring
countries, especially from Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia and the
Arab-emirates, Egypt created a new financial institution, the Arab
International Bank for Foreign Trade and Development (AIB) with
an original capital of ten million pound sterling fully subscribed
47. Dep't Economic & Social Affairs, Foreign Investment in Developing
Countries,U.N. Doc. E/4466 (1968), at 26.

48. [1971] MIDDLE EAST J. 507.
49. See Eighth Annual Report, 1969-1970, KuWArr FUND FOR ARAB ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 10-11; Nasr, The Kuwait Fund Scheme for the Guaranteeof InterArab Investments, [1972] KUWAIT FUND FOR ARAB ECON. DEVELOPMENT (May).
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by the Central Bank of Egypt. Any increase in capital may be
subscribed by Arab non-Egyptian nationals, i.e. governments, corporate bodies or individuals. AIB's function is to finance Egypt's
foreign trade and to act as agent for foreign investors in identifying,
appraising and financing projects. The bank is exempt from all
taxes and regulations, and deals entirely in convertible currencies.5 0 Shortly after the law was enacted, Arab capital began flowing in. One leading investor (with two million pounds) was Sheikh
Abdullah Al Moborak Al Sabbah of Kuwait who became a member
of the Board;5 ' another was the Federation of Arab Gulf Emirates
(six million pounds); a third was the Libyan Government (ten
million pounds).52
Along with the creation of the Bank, Egypt promulgated a foreign investment law providing for a five-year tax and customs
holiday, freedom to repatriate principal and profits and guarantees
against nationalization or expropriation. Such investments can be
made in industries within delineated "free zones," areas not subject to several of the restrictions normally applying to domestic
enterprises. 3 As to noncommercial risks, an official Egyptian
spokesman stated:
Foreign investment will not be subject to sequestration, nationalization, nor expropriation except in cases involving the national interest, and then fair compensation must be paid. The amount of the
compensation shall be estimated within six months. The amount of
the compensation shall be transferred in the same currency as that
in which the investment was originally made, and in annual instalments not exceeding five years. Disagreements about the amount of
the compensation shall be resolved by arbitration. 4
The amount of compensation for expropriated property is still a
critical problem. The principles for determining compensation dif50. Law No. 77, Oct. 10, 1971, Concerning the Establishment of the Egyptian
International Bank for Foreign Trade and Development, S.A.E.; Statutes of the
Egyptian International Bank for Foreign Trade and Development.
51. THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1971, at 93; The Washington Post, June 9, 1971,
at M4.
52. MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC SURVEY, June 2, 1972, at 5.
53. Decree Law No. 65 for 1971 Concerning the Investment of the Arab Funds

and Free Zones (English text in I.

SHIHATA, TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

INEGYPT 237-52 (1972)); Washington Post, Sept. 26, 1971, at A22.

54. Address by A.M. Kaissouni, American-Arab Association for Industry and
Commerce Meeting in New York, Nov. 3, 1971.
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fer dramatically between buyer and seller. Each can be internally
logical. Accordingly, it may prove more beneficial to agree on the
approach for assessing compensation, in order to avoid future disputes on this question.
Not only have LDC's favored multinational insurance schemes
for foreign investments falling under their control, one LDC country has gone to the limit of allowing a foreign operator to deduct
reserves for self-insurance if commercial insurance is not purchased. This is the case of Indonesia's agreement with a consortium of foreign firms called Indonesian Nickel. The host government has even accepted the unprecedented practice of leaving the
determination and size of such deduction to the discretion of the
foreign concessionaire.5 '

V.

"NATURALIZING" FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Students of international economic relations agree that conflicts
between host governments and international firms center on the
issue of extraterritoriality. 6 Other sources of conflict between host
countries and international firms may arise from the latter patronizing suppliers and contractors outside the host country, dominating the domestic credit market to the detriment of the smaller, less
resourceful local firms, refraining from plowing back earnings into
nationally desirable new activities, and refusing to allow participation of national capital and management. Various resolutions of
55. To several scholars and practitioners of development, an assured flow of
financial resources is not the major bottleneck to development; rather, it is primarily the absence of managerial skills. The manager of a development organization concluded "finance can normally be obtained from outside a developing
country, given a certain minimum level of stability, to supplement local resources
provided the right kind of projects are there. In fact, it is in most cases the scarcity
of the right sort of people in the right organization mobilized to identify, investigate, promote, and finally to manage commercial projects that constitutes the
effective limiting factor on development." Rendell, Commonwealth Development
CorporationExperience with Joint Ventures, in PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND
THE DEVELOPING WORLD 248 (P. Ady ed. 1971).
56. E.g., Johnson, The Multinational Corporationas a Development Agent,
1970 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 25; I. LITVAK & C. MAI.LE, FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE
EXPERIENCE OF HOST COUNTRIES 23-27 (1970); Rosenstein-Rodan, Multinational
Investment in the Framework of Latin American Integration, in MULTINATIONAL
INVESTMENT, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, IN THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
OF LATIN AMERICA 33 (1968). [April 1968] ROUND TABLE, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, BOGOTA, COLOMBIA, 80-87.
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the United Nations (in response to LDC wishes) have upheld solemnly the inalienable right of permanent national sovereignty over
natural resources. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of
African Unity, in a resolution passed at its Seventh Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa on June 15, 1971, went further. Besides reaffirming national sovereignty in the exploitation of natural resources, the OAU resolution "denounces the economic and political pressures which certain developed countries are attempting to
bear on African countries with a view to threatening their development and to obstructing them in the exercize of their sovereignty
over their natural resources, [and] recommends the formation of
an African Union of Mineral Exporting Countries." 57
To ease tension and reduce the chances of confrontation between
expatriate firms and their parent countries on one hand, and host
LDC's sensitive about their "sovereignty" on the other hand,
changes are needed in contractual relations between the parties
concerned. One could advance a variety of approaches, starting
with the renegotiation of economic terms of foreign concessions,
and reaching the gradual divestment of foreign enterprise. The
merits or demerits of each approach should be analyzed in light of
58
each host country's social, political and economic circumstances.
A.

Renegotiation

A number of countries have enacted legislation to permit the
renegotiation of certain economic terms of contracts entered into
by government and private business. Indeed, Professor Kindleberger has written, "Renegotiations of contracts with long life when
the underlying conditions change is familiar in the Anglo-Saxon
tradition. We have renegotiation of U.S. Government procurement
57. CM/Res. 245 (XVII). Host countries, whether developed or developing,
have attempted to counter the intrusion of foreign laws and regulations. Most
prominent in this respect have been the Canadian, Japanese and West European
countries that have limited the extension of foreign laws while still providing
opportunities for foreign investments to play a positive role in selected sectors of
their economies. LDC's, by comparison, have generally been less judicious and
effective. Their response to foreign firms and to parent countries' laws may vary
from inaction to drastic measures such as nationalization-sometimes with secondary regard to social costs.
58. See Kindleberger, U.S. Policy Toward Direct Investment with Special

Reference to the Less Developed Countries, in 2
ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
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when subsequent information reveals that profits would be exorbitant at the costs the contractor is able to achieve."" The United
States Renegotiation Act of 1951, for example, aims at profit limitation on defense and space contracts and related subcontracts by
authorizing the recoupment of excessive profits. By June 30, 1971,
Board determinations of excessive profits aggregated 1.095 billion
dollars and voluntary refunds and price reductions amounted to
more than 1.36 billion dollars." The Government's decisions on
normal return and excessive profits are not confined to procurement contracts; they also pertain to the public utilities field. Moreover, United States authorities have stretched their regulation of
normal return to companies operating beyond their national
boundaries. Thus the Federal Power Commission recommended
that return on equity investments by El Paso Natural Gas from the
export of Algerian natural gas to the United States be limited to
sixteen per cent.'
The renegotiation of certain economic terms of long-term contracts provides a measure of flexibility for adapting to changing
circumstances. It could help the firm by lightening its fiscal burden if mineral discoveries prove disappointing, and could help the
host country by providing it with the opportunity of benefiting
from windfall gains, or from tax credits in the firm's home country.
Some LDC's have attempted to emulate the United States experience. They have, on several occasions, asked for the renegotiation
of contracts affecting the exploitation of their natural resources.
Several host governments, as owners and lessors of these resources,
have claimed the right of recouping excess profits. Others have
asked for equity and management participation in mineral ventures, but countries at an early stage of development, like Abu
Dhabi in the Arabian peninsula, have been careful not to seek
immediate control over their foreign owned and operated enterprises. Commenting on the subject of national control, that country's Minister of Petroleum and Industry said: "We are a small
country of limited means. .

.

. Other countries can afford to go

faster by taking big leaps ahead. For us, it would be more prudent
C.KINDLEBERGER, AMERICAN BUSINEss ABROAD 151 (1969).
60. 16 RENEGOTIATION BD. ANN. REP. 1-2 (1971).
61. Initial Brief of the Federal Power Commission on Algeria Gas Imports by
59.

El Paso, Aug. 16, 1971, at 25 (1971); 47 F.P.C.

-

(Opinion No. 622, June 28,

1972).
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to move slowly but safely. First of all, we have to constitute the
cadres necessary for the exploitation of our resources and the de6' 2
velopment of our country.
B.

Joint Ventures

Through joint ventures, host governments hope to influence
their foreign partners more effectively than they would be able to
influence wholly foreign-owned concessions, possibly to induce the
joint venture to carry out other business activities ranking high in
national priorities. According to Kenneth Kaunda, the President
of Zambia, joint ventures between foreign companies and ZIMCO,
the national development group, are more conducive to growth
than total national ownership. 3
A number of foreign concessionaires have offered host governments participation in their ventures at a distant future date from
the start of operation, after reaping the attractive profits they had
hoped for. One example from the mining industry is the iron ore
concession granted by Peru to Marcona Mining Company in 1952.
The Peruvian state-owned steel company, Corporacion Peruana
del Santa, holds an option to acquire 50 per cent ownership in 1982
(30 years after the original award date) without cash investm.ent 4
International firms recently have accelerated the process of host
country participation, albeit reluctantly. Some host governments

62. See ARAB OIL AND GAS, Dec. 16, 1971, at 10.
63. "In order that this growth may continue unfettered ZIMCO is going to
need money and technical expertise and this is where our philosophy of permanent partnership as against transient partnership is in our opinion particularly
suitable to our situation. We need to augment our domestic sources of investment
with foreign sources of investment. We need to augment our domestic skills with
the sophisticated technical know-how of other countries. We need partners in

progress." President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia,

CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT,

1971

(Zambia Industrial and Mining Corp., Ltd. 1972).
64. Robinson, Competition in the Sale of Iron Ore in World Markets, XI
CONVENCION DE INGENIEROS DE MINAS DEL PERU 2 (1969). The concessionaire
Marcona exploited to advantage the fact that it had among its shareholders the
politically influential Prado family. (In 1960, the President of Peru was Manuel
Prado, while the president of Marcona was Max Pena Prado.) These associations
have apparently helped the company to obtain more attractive terms, to the
detriment of Peru's better interests. See W. PURSER, METAL-MINING IN PERU, PAST
AND PRESENT 156-59 (1971). The Prado family, in a joint 50/50 venture with Standard Oil of California, won also a refinery concession in 1960. See A. QUIJANO,
NATIONALISM AND CAPITALISM IN PERU: A STUDY IN NEO-IMPERIALISM (1971).
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even have obtained majority ownership but foreign partners have
demanded assurances that they will share effectively in decision
making in the major business areas of budgeting and planning,
production and control, pricing and marketing, and organizing and
staffing. Host governments have been able to achieve this form of
partnership when they could offer comparatively attractive terms
for domestic inputs, such as fiscal incentives, and assured domestic or export markets, or when they could play on the rivalry of
several firms. According to one student of international business,
"the resistance of the enterprise to any threat to its centralized
control has been broken only when technology or marketing [or
production, this author adds] control has slipped out of the hands
of the oligopolists."65 In support of majority ownership in joint
ventures, one empirical investigation dealing with Canada concludes that "the alleged redistribution of oligopoly profits from
foreigners to Canadians may be an illusion""0 if minority ownership
of foreign enterprises is promoted. That author argues that "the
ultimate impact of promoting minority ownership may be to erode
the political basis of other, more effective policies seeking to control foreign investment behavior.""
To increase national ownership of key industries, several developed countries have offered financial aid to nationals. The Australian Government, for example, established on June 10, 1970, an
Australian Industry Development Corporation to assist financially
Australians who are interested in acquiring ownership of, and
eventually control over, industries and resources hitherto dominated by foreign interests. LDC's, as compared with Canada or
Australia, are far less equipped to protect their interests with minority ownership. There are many examples of "straw man" domestic partners, private or state owned, that do not play an active
role in enterprises labelled as "joint."
C.

Service Contracts

Several host countries, in their search for economic independ65. Wells, The MultinationalBusiness Enterprise: What Kind of International Organization?,25 INT'L ORGANIZATION 458 (1971). See also Franko, Do Joint
Ventures Still Make Sense in Europe?, [Jan.-Feb. 1972] WORLDWIDE P & I
PLANNING 22, 25-30.
66. HORST, ON THE BENEFITS OF DOMESTIC MINORITY OWNERSHIP OF FOREIGN-

FIRMS 2-3 (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research No. 176, 1971).
Id.at 3.

CONTROLLED

67.
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ence, prefer to have the principal say in managing their resources,
while depending on expatriates for technical advice for a limited
period of time. These countries have favored the service contract
approach. Under one type of service contract arrangement the foreign firm assumes the managerial and technical responsibility and
the financial and operational risks of exploring, developing and
processing natural resources on its own, over a prearranged period.
In return, the venturing firm is rewarded, short of a share of ownership, with a "fee." This can be a payment in kind or in money, and
can be graduated according to size of discoveries, profits, foreign
exchange savings, ventured resources or other variables. Service
contracts are extremely flexible devices that meet the needs of host
countries for filling gaps in managerial know-how, technology and
other inputs. They can be adapted to widely diverse circumstances, and may satisfy a host country's objective of greater control
over its natural resources consistent with maximum national economic gain. 8
Although international mineral enterprises have generally favored achieving vertical integration, mostly in the form of wholly
owned subsidiaries, in the absence of such options, they have
agreed to joint ventures or service contracts. Faced with reasons for
exclusive domestic ownership, the international companies also
have settled for long-term supply contracts. These contracts can
"tie" the domestic operation to the international enterprise, providing for specified shipments, defined quantities, set prices, financing and even supervised production. Supply contracts constitute, in effect, an informal system of vertical integration with no
formal relations of ownership. This interdependence builds economic security of flows for the buying and selling parties.
D. Divestment
In the petroleum and mining industries, it is common for concessionaires to relinquish their properties to host governments at the
end of the lease period, which may extend over several decades."1
To insure that mineral properties are kept in good working condition until the expiration of concessions, many host countries have
68.

See G. MEIER, LEADING ISSUES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 306-08 (2d ed.

1970).
69. See Z.

MIKDASHI,

A

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

CONCESSIONS: 1901-1965, at 293-314 (1966).
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passed special rules and regulations. The Venezuelan Act requires
concessionaires to contribute to a Guarantee Fund at the rate of
ten per cent of their depreciation charge used for income tax purposes. The contributions to the Fund will be returned intact if
concessionaires revert their assets in good condition. According to
President Caldera of Venezuela: "The country has taken an alert
position to guard and ensure the abidance by these rules, so that
when reversion takes place [in 1983], in accordance with the
preexistent legal regulation, Venezuela would not only receive
some waste lands, abandoned wells and a few pieces of scrap
iron."7
Few concessions, however, provide in the original agreements for
purchase options or for the phasing out of foreign ownership and
control during the life of the contract. Purchase options have the
obvious advantage from the host country standpoint of providing
national interests with the opportunity for profitable investment
and for learning the mineral business during a period of partnership with the international firm.
With the growth of economic nationalism, some profitable
foreign-owned ventures may have to accept a gradual divestment
of their properties in LDC's, starting within a few years from the
beginning of commercial operations. The expatriate companies
would then turn from producers and processors of raw materials in
these countries into buyers of these materials from the host countries' national companies. Optimal divestment calls for devising a
framework for the orderly, gradual and appropriate timing, in accordance with the socio-economic circumstances of the country
concerned, of transfer of ownership and management from expatriate firms to host country interests. Payment for the transfer of
ownership can be made regularly by the host government paying
in kind with the commodities produced, or in money with royalty
or income tax due to it. Alternatively, nationals can be offered the
opportunity of buying out the foreign-owned ventures, assuming
they have the resources.
Some scholars, however, have questioned the wisdom of divestment applied across the board. In a number of cases, international
firms continue to contribute to national economies through a
70. Reprinted in an Address by Hugo Perez La Salvia, Minister of Mines and
Hydrocarbons, before the Pan American Society of New England in Boston, April
25, 1972.
Spring, 1974

POLICY ISSUES

broadening and deepening of their involvement. Accordingly, "a
program of divestiture that cuts off this process could be hurtful
to the governments that were demanding it."'" A United States
presidential commission came out bluntly against programs aimed
at facilitating the sale and transfer of ownership of foreign affiliates
to host countries. It said:
In some countries, an important new deterrent to investment from
abroad is developing-the "fade-out" arrangement, which requires
that established as well as new foreign investors sell their ownership
interests to local owners, either government or private, over a period
of years. We believe the United States should actively discourage
host countries from instituting fade-out requirements and from prescribing the form and extent of local equity participation. 2
On the other hand, a number of other scholars and policy makers
have advocated the transfer of ownership and control of foreign
ventures to local interests as a means of speeding up economic
development.7 3 It is possible that local ownership to the exclusion
of foreign interests can reduce the availability of foreign capital
and know-how, and retard development. There is an optimal mix
for each country of what is politically desirable in terms of foreign
ownership and what is economically achievable in national development with various levels of foreign participation. The
divestment-investment approach was discussed in 1968 by a
Round Table on Multinational Investment, sponsored by the
Inter-American Development Bank. It viewed foreign investment
"as a rotating fund that temporarily, over periods of varying
lengths, depending on the kind of investment, offsets the shortage
of technical and financial resources on the part of local enterprise."
According to this view, "the foreign investor should be prepared at
all times to transfer majority interest in the firm to local investors

71.

See, e.g., R.

VERNON,

Problems and Policies Regarding Multinational

Enterprises, UNITED

STATES INTERNATIONAL POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD
also R. VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL SPREAD

999 (1971). See
OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 269 (1971).
72. UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC POLICY IN AN INTERDEPENDENT

WORLD 251 (Report to the President, submitted by the Comm'n on Int'l Trade
and Investment Policy 1971).

See, e.g., Hirschman, How to Divest in Latin America, and Why, in
(1969); Streeten, Obstacles to Private Foreign
Investment in the LDC's, [1970] COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 37-39.
73.
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and be ready to seek other investment opportunities in those activities where technological contributions continue to be of fundamental importance."" To carry out the divestment process it may
be advisable to be selective. The host country may be offered the
initiative in pointing to those activities or "firms where foreign
ownership is felt to be irksome," 75-probably those firms considered too dominant in key sectors of the country's economy.
To smooth the transfer of foreign interests in developing countries, while not constricting availability of foreign capital and
know-how to developing countries, there may therefore be a need
for a novel financial institution. This could be called the International Divestment-Investment Corporation (IDIC), and could be
entrusted with the functions of supervising the progressive liquidation of foreign investments and the transfer of their ownership and
management to national interests. It should also act as a financier
or trustee, or both, for a period of transition when the expatriate
firms are ready and willing to make the transfer of assets, but when
national interests may not have adequate financial resources to
pay for the transfer at that time, or may not have the managerial
capacity and technical know-how to administer these assets. IDIC
could furthermore be entrusted with the function of guarantor of
debtor obligations, and could be called on to act as a neutral arbiter in settling disputes or disagreements about the valuation of
assets to be transferred.
The function of financial intermediary requires that IDIC have
resources of its own. Whether these resources should be raised from
the international money and capital markets, or whether they
should be raised from existing international financial institutions
deserves special investigation. Such an investigation will also have
to assess the basis of contributions to be made by divestinginvesting firms, host countries and parent countries. On this point,
Raul Prebisch commented,
[Ilt may perhaps be difficult to understand how an advanced country could contribute financial resources in order to enable Latin
American [and other LDC's, one may add] private initiative to
obtain control of undertakings which would otherwise remain in the
74.

Inter-American Development Bank, Introduction, in

MULTINATIONAL IN-

VESTMENT, PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, IN THE ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION
OF LATIN AMERICA 15 (1968).

75.

See Hirschman, supra note 73, at 13.
Spring, 1974

POLICY ISSUES

hands of the developed country's private enterprise. But this would
be too short-sighted a view. . ..

The continuing process of technol-

ogical improvement will leave foreign enterprise ample scope for
action, since as soon as domestic initiative has acquired a controlling interest in certain enterprises, new opportunities for association
on a basis of reciprocal benefits will supervene. 6
Already, the Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC),
specifically set up in 1948 by the British Treasury to contribute to
the development of LDC's (until 1969 confined to the Commonwealth) through equity capital, soft-term loans and managerial
know-how, has agreed to arrange for a gradual transfer to local
ownership and management of the productive enterprises it has
helped set up. This transfer is done selectively. The General Manager of CDC, Sir William Rendell, commented:
We tend to be inveterate "ad-hocers" on this, formulas that give
options for purchasing X per cent of the shares of such-and-such a
company at such-and-such a price over a given period of years. But
the answer is that it is our policy to dispose of our projects when we
can get a reasonable price for them and when we can afford to do
so, and particularly-I have stressed this-to local investors, not
just to sell them to somebody in London who may wish to make an
African investment-if there are such people. That is part of our
7
policy. 1
A broadly similar function is performed by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a member of the World Bank group. One
major difference in the nature of the functions of the two institutions is that IFC is committed to assisting solely private enterprises, to the explicit exclusion of government-owned or controlled
institutions, while no such limitation is found with CDC.
The timing of divestment should normally come after a period
when the foreign investor has been able to recoup both capital and
adequate profits given the risks attendant to its investment. This
period would be longer for a company exploring for a mineral in a
virgin territory, than for one exploring in an already proven territory. Flexibility should obtain in the sale of investments, and the
host government and its nationals should be eligible to exercise the
76. R. PREBISCH, CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT-LATIN AMERIcA'S GREAT TASK:
REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 171 (1971).
77. PRIVATE FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD (P. Ady ed.
1971).
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purchase option over reasonably long periods, to allow for their
ability to pay for and manage the domestic venture. Equally, the
expatriate company should be given the opportunity of running the
venture for a longer period alone, or in partnership with local interests, if the two parties find it in their mutual interest to do so."8
It is possible that leading creditor-investor developed countries
and their international firms would be reluctant to support an
institution such as IDIC. 79 In view of the presence of likely political
difficulties, it is more practical to have each country establish
explicitly its legal framework for foreign enterprises with divestment, reinvestment or other guidelines agreed on in advance in
individual contracts, and translated to meet the particular needs
of a country and the international enterprise concerned. There are
a number of historical cases of international companies accepting
voluntarily the conversion of their investments into joint ventures
with domestic enterprises, both state-owned and privately-owned.
There are also cases in which the international enterprise has voluntarily divested or sold one affiliate to develop other activities.
A notable example is that of Mexico. Mineral deposits in that
country are owned by the state, and mining concessions were
given, until 1961, in perpetuity, assuming normal conditions. The
Mexican Government introduced in 1961 tax laws reducing to 25
years the life of mining concessions with renewals subject to majority equity interest by Mexican nationals. To induce such "Mexicanization," the government granted a 50 per cent reduction in
production and export taxes. Several international enterprises
have found the Mexican offer enticing. Anaconda, historically the
largest producer of Mexican copper, took advantage of the Mexicanization law in 1971. The principal obstacle in the process of its
divestment was "a shortage of liquid investment capital in Mexico
available to purchase a majority interest.""0 The largest group of
Mexican investors with available resources turned out to be government agencies.
For another example, the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (U.S.) sold, in 1969, its telephone system in Peru
78. See also R. VERNON, supra note 71, at 1000.
79. See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THE IBD's FIRST DECADE AND
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE FUTURE 38, 157, 233, 235 (Round Table at Punta del Este,
Uruguay, April 1970).
80.

THE ANACONDA COMPANY, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1971).
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to the government for 17.9 million dollars and agreed to use 8.2
million dollars from the proceeds to expand locally in the hotel
business and to set up a joint venture with the government for the
construction of a telephone equipment factory.8 ' Probably the most
elaborate agreement for divestment-investment has been that between a Canadian holding company, Brazilian Light and Power
Company, Ltd., and the federal government of Brazil. The company, which is controlled by North American and West European
capital, agreed to sell in 1966 its telephone assets for 96.3 million
dollars. It concurrently agreed to reinvest 65 million dollars in
Brazilian ventures, and to observe important guidelines, mainly:
(a) the enterprises invested in should contribute to Brazil's development; (b) investment should be used to augment productive
capacity, not to buy out existing owners; and (c) investment
should be as a minority shareholder only. The Brazilian precedent
could well offer a pattern worthy of emulation by other developing
countries.8 2
With adequate incentives, a divestment-investment mechanism
applying to foreign enterprises could yield the host country valuable benefits in the transfer of technology and know-how, in the
development of managerial ability, in the acquisition of innovating
methods and processes of production and in the creation of successive and successful ventures, hopefully leading to a self-sustained
momentum of progressive development. The orderly transfer of
management and ownership to national interests need not, furthermore, lead to a divorce between the international firm and its
erstwhile affiliate. The new domestic venture can and may well be
advised to maintain business relations with its former parent, especially to arrange for managerial and technical cooperation, and
for the use of trademarks to take advantage of the international
company's continually evolving technology.83 This author adds
that it is also in the interest of the divested domestic venture to
maintain normal trading relations with the former international
parent and its clients. This is especially beneficial when the domestic venture is producing specialized items that fit specifically
81. W. FRIEDMANN & J-P. BEGUIN, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF RECENT TRENDS 397-99
(1971).
82. Id. at 294-95.
83. See R. PREBISCH, supra note 76, at 169-70.
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the production system of the international enterprise. It is also
useful when the domestic venture does not have ready access to
international markets.
The policy of requiring foreign private enterprises, old and new,
to divest gradually major portions of their ownership and control
in favor of local interests including employees has been incorporated in the Andean Pact,84 which includes Colombia, Ecuador,
Bolivia, Peru and Chile. The Pact requires an obligatory divestment on the part of all wholly foreign-owned enterprises of a minimum of fifteen per cent of the capital within a period not exceeding
three years from the date of enforcement of the Cartagena agreement, or the date of production of the enterprise. Divestment is
graduated to 51 per cent in favor of nationals, with slower schedules (over twenty years) for Bolivia and Ecuador than for Chile,
Colombia and Peru (over fifteen years). In quid pro quo for gradual
divestment, the divesting firms benefit from the incentive of dutyfree movement of goods within the five countries.
The challenge from the host country standpoint is to attract the
foreign firm to invest its resources (capital, managerial know-how
and technology) in the development and production of a host country's resources. To do so, the firm normally requires adequate control over a certain period of the life of the project as a guarantee
of return on its investments. On the other hand, the host country
should be assured of the expectation of national control through
buy-out options. Raymond Vernon believes that the foreign investor in raw materials can rationally require control for a period of
"15 years and maybe much shorter," expect to recoup its investment plus its opportunity cost, and accept surrender of its conces5
sion at the end of that period.8
Empirical case studies have shown that leading American companies have had significant influence on the legislature and on the
administration to prevent divestiture overseas even at times when
American public interest was not necessarily being adversely affected.8 Divestment must be accomplished with at least the tacit
84. See The Commission of the Acuerdo de Cartagena, Common Treatment
of Foreign Capital,Trademarks,Patents,Licensing Agreements and Royalties in
the Andean Common Market, 10 J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 339-59 (1972).
85. R. VERNON, SOME NOTES ON CONCESSIONS POLICY (Harvard Univ. Center
for Int'l Affairs, Development Advisory Service Rep. No. 117, Sept. 1968).
86. For an excellent study by a United States diplomat and economist see R.
BLOOMFIELD, WHO MAKES AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY? SOME LATIN AMERICAN CASE
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approval or neutrality of major industrial countries, lest these
countries use their potent trade, aid and other instruments against
LDC's. For example, if "prompt, adequate, and effective" compensation has not been paid to nationalized United States interests, the President can cut bilateral aid (the so-called "Hickenlooper Amendment" to the Foreign Assistance Act), and instruct
United States executive directors in the World Bank Group, the
Asian Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank to vote
against any loan for the benefit of the country concerned.87 President Nixon has come out sharply against LDC's nationalization of
United States property. As he put it, his new approach to the
developing nations "includes strong penalties designed to discourage the expropriation of American property abroad.""8
Spokesmen for developing countries have appealed to international agencies including the IBRD to become more attentive to
the needs of the Third World countries. They have pleaded in favor
of the unimpeded restitution of property to its lawful original owners, and have argued that "it is inconceivable that a country recuperating wealth of which it was dispossessed at one time in its
history should be asked to own property from others by indemnification, in the form, for example, of rent for the subsoil." 9
It is generally accepted by policy makers and scholars that there
is need for improvements in the framework of world economic relations within which the development process can be accelerated.
But the restructuring of the world economic order in a global strategy for development depends largely on the goodwill and cooperation of the rich countries, and their international enterprises. In
summing up his position at congressional hearings on United
States foreign economic policy, Raymond Vernon pointedly urged
the United States to share with other countries its growing economic power. He realistically noted, however, that this would call
(Harvard Univ. Center for Int'l Affairs, March 1972). See also Address
by Mason Gaffney, Benefits of Military Spending, to the 10th Annual Conference
of the Committee on Taxation, Resources, and Economic Development, in Madison, Wisconsin, Oct. 25, 1971.
87. Act of March 10, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-245; Act of March 10, 1972, Pub.
L. No. 92-246; Act of March 10, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-247.
88. Nixon, The Real Road to Peace, U.S. NEws & WORLD REPORT, June 26,
1972, at 39.
89. International Monetary Fund, Summary Proceedings, Annual Meeting,
1971, at 94 (1972). See also Sonatrach, supra note 9.
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for a wisdom that has been a rare quality in the life of nations."
The opportunity for greater world harmony lies in promoting
greater global interdependence in a variety of fields with fair sharing of benefits by all parties concerned. There are already several
examples of successful international cooperative ventures, and this
article has attempted to suggest additional possibilities. The
suggestions presented above vary in nature. Some are oriented
toward competitiveness (e.g., RAS), while others aim at exploiting
market forces through group action. They can, however, be reconciled on the basis that they aim generally at serving the dual objectives of promoting global harmony while improving, in favor of
LDC's, the distribution of gain from primary trade. All types of
group action assume the presence of some measure of political
goodwill for cooperation among nations.
Of the suggestions presented above, it appears that the centralized exchange of information (RAS) is likely to encounter the least
resistance, and accordingly appears more readily enforceable. RAS
can also promote communication, leading probably to improved
mutual trust and cooperation. The development of new financial
and guarantee institutions among or for LDC's could be another
move in the realm of the practical. Of course, this article has in
no way exhausted the list of promising fields for possible cooperation in extractive industries between business and government at
the national, regional and international level. Conservation of nonrenewable natural resources, and the protection of the environment are two of the areas for possible cooperation worthy of immediate consideration.

90. "We are at a point of history in which increased economic interdependence looks close to inevitable. But it is a lopsided interdependence, one in which
the United States is seen as gaining most from the continuation of the trend, and
losing least from its interruption. From a political and psychological point of view,
that is a dangerous situation. If we are to mitigate the tension that. the situation
generates, it will be by action that comes hard to the nation state: by curbing the
full exercise of our overwhelming economic power and by pooling that power with
others. That kind of action will take a kind of wisdom and restraint which is rare
in the history of nations." Testimony of Raymond Vernon, Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Economic Comm., 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 152 (1970).
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